Space Access Update #92 4/5/00 Copyright 2000 by Space Access Society ________________________________________________________________________ (SAS's eighth annual conference, "Space Access 2000", will be at the Holiday Inn Old Town in Scottsdale Arizona April 27-29 - see the upcoming SAU #93 or http://www.space-access.org for details. Our hotel room block guarantee ends Friday 4/7/00 - reserve now!) ________________________________________________________________________ Contents: - NASA's Proposed 2001-2005 Space Launch Initiative - Our Recommended Changes Attachment: - SAS FY 2001 Policy Recommendations (reprinted from SAU #91, 2/7/00) ________________________________________________________________________ NASA's Proposed 2001-2005 Space Launch Initiative Background NASA spent the last five years engaged in a process that was supposed to provide the data for a decision at the start of the year 2000 on the future of NASA and US commercial space transportation. The centerpiece of this process was the $1.3 billion X-33/Venturestar project. X-33's main goal was to fly a half-scale feasibility proof for the proposed "Venturestar" reusable space transport; Venturestar was aimed at meeting NASA launch requirements while also capturing enough of the US commercial (and military) launch market to get commercial investors to pay for development. The X-33/Venturestar project has failed, as discussed in detail in our last issue ( http://www.space-access.org/updates/sau91.html). The available evidence is that that Lockheed-Martin cannot build the (multilobe conformal-tanks, lifting-body) design they sold to NASA at anything near light enough weight for a practical reusable rocket space transport, even if they are allowed considerable extra time and money. Meanwhile, investor confidence in the project is conspicuously lacking; the only hope it has for "commercial" finance is an effective federal subsidy in the form of (unlikely) government loan guarantees. By last fall, NASA had come up with a plan, the ASTP (Advanced Space Transportation Plan), after collecting US industry's input via the Space Transportation Architecture Studies (STAS) then apparently ignoring this input wherever it conflicted with the agendas of the major NASA space-launch centers: the JSC/KSC Shuttle/Station establishment, and the MSFC launch technology development center. ASTP would have given JSC major Shuttle upgrades after a nominal competition with new paper "Second Generation" (IE near-term rocket- powered) reusable launcher designs, while MSFC would have gotten significant ongoing funding to develop all the new launch technologies they wanted, just as long as these technologies were so ultra-advanced "Third Generation" that they couldn't possibly provide competition for Shuttle in less than a generation. We didn't like this plan (see SAU #91, "NASA's New Plan") and neither, it seems, did the White House Office of Management and Budget, OMB - the people NASA has to justify plans to before they show up in White House budget submissions to Congress. The plan that emerged in the White House FY 2001 NASA budget proposal released in early February differs significantly from last fall's ASTP. The "Space Launch Initiative" NASA's latest five-year plan, the $4.5 billion Space Launch Initiative (see http://nais.msfc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/EPS/synopsis.cgi?acqid=25421 for details) superficially addresses some of the problems with previous efforts: It calls for a goal of at least two competing commercial launch systems serving NASA needs, it partially breaks out NASA requirements into a semi-separate "NASA-Unique Systems" project, and it pays lip-service to expanding the contractor base beyond the current limited (both in numbers and in recent results - the *better* of the two remaining majors can't keep track of Station costs or Station hardware) post-consolidation field. We do not question the good intentions of the people who've come up with this plan. But recent history has made plain that NASA is at heart, like it or not, a massive government bureaucracy, and good intentions seldom beat bureaucratic mass. Intentions entirely aside, NASA's new plan is still fatally flawed, in that it's based on two fundamentally wrong assumptions: - One, that yet another Government-sponsored attempt to force convergence between NASA space transportation needs and US commercial launch needs (in the hope that NASA requirements might be met with commercial development funding) is either practical or desirable. It is neither. Both previous such efforts (the pre-Challenger shutdown of the US ELV (Expendable Launch Vehicle) industry in favor of Shuttle, and the X- 33/Venturestar project) have been practical disasters, in significant part because NASA and commercial requirements in terms of system performance, political control, staffing, and costs are fundamentally incompatible. Commercial launch customers were switching to Ariane even before loss of Challenger shut down NASA Shuttle for two years, and there was no real prospect of unsubsidized commercial investment in "Venturestar" even before the current technical/management problems surfaced. Both previous such efforts have also been disasters in that, despite the improbability of success for the government's repeated attempts at NASA-commercial convergence, the mere fact of a government-sponsored effort to seize a majority of the commercial launch market deterred commercial investment in competing systems. What sane commercial investor wants to compete against the government? This has been a significant factor in the radical decline in US share of the international commercial launch market. There have been (with considerable encouragement from DOD) some cautious investments in improved commercial ELV's, enough to at least stop the bleeding and stabilize US launch market share somewhat below fifty percent, but investments in the sort of radically cheaper launch systems that might allow the US to start regaining lost market share have been few and far between, with no projects financed through to completion yet. Odds are, if NASA is allowed to proceed with yet another five-year plan to shotgun-wed NASA and commercial launch requirements, the results will be both another expensive failure, and also another five years wasted for the US companies that want to leapfrog current ELV technology and bring the US a much larger share of the growing international launch market. - The second wrong assumption underlying this latest five-year plan is that meeting NASA's internal space launch needs should be the central goal of NASA space launch development efforts. This is not just inference on our part; NASA comes right out and say that the primary customer for this effort is NASA, in the "Launch Initiative Program Description" at http://std.msfc.nasa.gov/progdesc.pdf, and in a quote attributed to the NASA Administrator at the Advanced Space Transportation Plan rollout in Huntsville last October: "The customer is NASA" - IE, the NASA Shuttle/Station establishment, representing as it does half of NASA's overall budget, by far the largest NASA consumer of space launch and by far the largest bureaucratic political power center within the agency. The fact is, though, that the commercial space market surpassed the total of government space business back in the mid-nineties, and world commercial space continues to grow fast while government space is essentially flat. Aerospace exports are the largest single area of US trade surplus - but this surplus is shrinking. NASA is supposed to be supporting US commercial (and defense) advanced aerospace vehicle needs, not just internal NASA agendas. To date, and in this new five-year plan too, NASA is failing this task miserably - apparently doing their damndest to ignore it entirely, where they can't subsume it to their own internal needs. A US share of a fast growing world market that's barely holding on in the forties is too important to subordinate to NASA bureaucratic turf defense. We don't argue that NASA's internal space launch needs should be ignored, mind. All arguments about high cost versus limited returns for the current Shuttle/Station program aside, we can't stop flying astronauts into space without significant negative effect on national morale - the Challenger standdown was a national trauma; the ongoing manned space program remains a major national status symbol. This country is, however, under no obligation to always conduct this program as expensively as we do now. The fiction that NASA space launch needs can be shotgun-wedded to commercial requirements has allowed repeated attempts by the Shuttle/Station establishment to ignore realistic examination of cost versus capabilities in pursuing function-for-function replacements for Shuttle. (Shuttle's large "downmass" capability in particular needs scrutiny - it's the main thing a (considerably cheaper) combination of a smaller "space taxi" plus heavy-lift expendables can't provide, and it is used so seldom that rational analysis will likely show that it'd be far cheaper to either build new copies of the occasional large "downmass" payloads, or leave them in orbit between uses, rather than pay to continue this rarely used capability.) Policy Change Recommendations NASA must be instructed to cease efforts to square the circle; this latest shotgun wedding between NASA and commercial advanced space launch development must be called off. Yes, NASA needs to devote a significant level of effort to supporting their own Shuttle/Station establishment's launch needs - but they also need to support US industry's need for technological advances that will allow significant market share (and national security) gains. Most important of all, given the NASA Shuttle/Station establishment's demonstrated ability to bend all available agency resources toward its internal agendas, a firewall is needed between the NASA-specific and the commercial advanced launch support efforts, a very solid firewall. On the assumption that $4.5 billion over five years to meet national space launch needs is actually on the table, we recommend: - $3 billion of this be formally committed to supporting NASA's internal need to back up (and eventually to replace) Shuttle. Half this amount should continue to go to the "NASA-Unique Systems" project, in essence an effort to combine various Crew Return Vehicle and Crew Transfer Vehicle efforts into an overall "Space Taxi" project aimed at a flexible general-purpose space transport capable of launch via Shuttle, via EELV-Heavy, or via future as-yet undefined commercial reusable systems. NASA should build the F-250 crew-cab pickup of space, rather than another eighteen-wheeler Winnebago. The other half should be divided between "Space Taxi" integration with EELV (with emphasis on subscale demonstration of reliable emergency vehicle separation and recovery, rather than on extensive "man-rating" changes to EELV to marginally increase booster reliability) and such other NASA-unique systems as NASA deems appropriate - Station small package delivery, subscale reusable flyback booster demos, et cetera. - $1.5 billion, or $300 million a year, should be committed to support the US commercial space launch sector, via NASA "Future-X" and/or via similar organizations under DOD - DARPA, AFRL Phillips, and ONR all come to mind. NASA's current budget submission calls for shutting down "Future-X" after current projects are complete; if NASA genuinely doesn't want the job of supporting US commercial and defense advanced space launch needs, other agencies are available. Splitting available funds among more than one sponsoring agency makes sense anyway, in that competition concentrates the bureaucratic mind wonderfully. The general approach should be to support construction and intensive testing of actual hardware at the edge of the current practical state- of-the-art, in ground tests and flight demonstrations of individual subsystems and integrated vehicles. In order to spread the eggs among many baskets and to encourage diverse competing approaches,the maximum size for any individual project should be what NASA currently calls "Pathfinder" class, one to two hundred million dollars total, with many smaller projects also included in the mix. In order to expand the potential reusable aerospace-frame vendor base beyond the current post-consolidation pair, the risk of awarding significant hardware contracts to unproven or startup companies should be accepted. (We note in passing that NASA has effectively done exactly this in awarding the "Pathfinder" class X-34 project to Orbital Sciences - when OSC finishes X-34, they'll be in good position to credibly pursue a commercial RLV venture. We approve, and we'd like to see this precedent expanded to other companies.) (We also note that given the recent track record of the established majors, going with startups won't likely increase risk very much.) Finally, and very important, projects should be selected on the basis of providing practical advances in reusable space launch systems of near-term use to US commercial and defense interests. "NASA requirements" should be kept on the far side of an inviolable firewall. NASA manned space will eventually end up using systems developed under this program, but given their record of protecting bureaucratic turf at expense of the national interest, NASA launch customers *must* not be allowed to interfere with this program. *end* ________________________________________________________________________ Space Access Society's sole purpose is to promote radical reductions in the cost of reaching space. You may redistribute this Update in any medium you choose, as long as you do it unedited in its entirety. ________________________________________________________________________ Space Access Society http://www.space-access.org space.access@space-access.org "Reach low orbit and you're halfway to anywhere in the Solar System" - Robert A. Heinlein ________________________________________________________________________ ----------Text Attachment---------- (We originally published the following NASA advanced launch development policy analysis and recommendations on February seventh, 2000, the same day NASA unveiled its FY 2001 budget request, which includes initiation of a $4.5 billion, five-year "Space Launch Initiative". We've seen nothing in that plan to radically alter our conclusions and recommendations, and much to confirm them.) Eleven Months Till 2001, And We're Still Stuck On This Rock - Now What? SAS FY 2001 Policy Recommendations - On NASA X-33: If Lockheed-Martin truly believes X-33 is still relevant to anything other than saving corporate face, let them prove it by paying for all additional costs from this point forward. NASA should support them in this if Lockheed-Martin chooses to continue, but without spending any further taxpayer dollars on the project. If indeed Lockheed-Martin is serious about Venturestar as a genuine commercial project, and if indeed they believe X-33 still has any relevance to the much-changed Venturestar design, let them put their own money where their mouth is. Otherwise, it's time to shut X-33 down as being an expensive lesson in what not to do in pursuing cheaper space launch. - On Federal loan guarantees for space launch projects: We oppose any measure that would have the effect of picking and subsidizing a "winner" or winners from among the variety of companies planning low-cost launch projects. All such measures we have seen to date have, for all practical purposes, been aimed at some specific company. We do not oppose Federal support for commercial low-cost launch ventures in general, but we have yet to see legislation introduced that would provide such support on a level playing field. - On Federal support for development of low-cost reusable launch technology: Available funds should be increased modestly, should be focussed on a variety of relatively small projects aimed at flight- demonstrating a variety of different near-term payoff approaches, should not be confined to projects proposed by the existing major firms, should not be allocated by just one government agency, and should be allocated by organizations and to organizations willing to pay attention to past lessons on successfully advancing the aerospace state-of-the-art via X-vehicle projects. Specifically, we would like to see more funding for NASA "Future-X" flight demonstrator projects, and also for similar projects in appropriate (IE not hidebound-bureaucratized) agencies under DOD. Competition is good - the recent policy of one specialty, one center, eliminating intra-government competition, has greatly reduced incentives to succeed, by reducing the danger of losing funding to another agency in the event of failure. Instead, agencies have taken to defending failure by claiming the job was impossible anyway. Absent competition, who can prove otherwise? Ideally, we would like to see, between NASA and DOD over the next decade, one new start per year of a one-to-two hundred million dollar-class reusable launch flight demonstrator project, with the goal of giving all credible players (and not just the existing majors) a chance to show what they can do. There are a wide variety of credible approaches to cheap space transportation. But commercial investors so far will not pay to see which might fly and which won't; the payoff is too uncertain and too long-term. The Federal government can, for no more per-year than NASA spent on X-33, separate the wheat from the chaff, to the point where a few years from now commercial investors (and government procurement officials) will be able to make sensible low-risk decisions on low-cost reusable space vehicles. - Shuttle: The NASA Space Shuttle should be maintained and operated on missions of national importance until its variety of functions can be replaced by various more specialized lower-cost vehicles. Routine NASA space transportation services should end up commercially contracted for, just as NASA currently procures routine air transportation services. NASA isn't allowed to operate its own airline - over the long term, the agency should also be moved away from operating its own spaceline. In the short term, a flexibly-launched (on EELV, Shuttle, or future reusables) Crew/Cargo Transfer Vehicle (CCTV) should be rapidly developed as a supplement to and potential emergency replacement for Shuttle, in order to, at acceptable cost, assure NASA's ability to meet its manned-space commitments. Shuttle upgrades should be limited to addressing immediate safety concerns and to providing operating cost and/or capability improvements that will pay for themselves in the short term. The current prohibition on Shuttle competing with commercial launch providers should be continued indefinitely, to avoid disrupting an emerging industry that is currently fragile and in the long run is vital to the nation's economic security and national defense. - NASA's massive "manned space" Shuttle-Station establishment in general needs to be brought to heel. They currently consume half of NASA's overall budget while providing at-best dubious results. Meanwhile they far too often act as the hypertrophied tail wagging the NASA dog. For one example, the nominally separate branch of NASA that deals with advancing space transportation technology seems totally unable to make plans that don't give priority to the manned space empire's requirements over those of US industry and US defense agencies. X-33 and now ISTP both suffered badly from this. - NASA's space technology centers need to pay far more attention to the practical needs of US industry. On March 3, 1915, the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (later the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics or NACA) was established by a rider to the Naval Appropriations Act, "..to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight, with a view of their practical solution." *Practical* solution. Workable solutions *now*, not ultra-advanced whizbangs in twenty years. A working rocket engineer recently told us he has file cabinets full of old NACA reports that he uses every day - they're models of concise, accurate, useful information. He says that reports from the first few years after NACA became NASA are still useful, but after the early sixties things went downhill, badly. NACA was vital to the success of the US aviation industry. To the struggling US low-cost launch industry, today's NASA is no such asset. One example of the sort of work NASA ought to be doing but isn't: Most current rocket engines were intended to be thrown away after one flight, and thus reuse of them has not been explored and documented. Reports on the practical reusability of various engines - relight procedures, throttling potential, number of cycles, minutes of burn-time, wear and recommended maintenance intervals for various parts - would be immensely useful to reusable launch designers, however tedious and unglamorous they'd be to generate. NASA's spaceflight technology centers have lost sight of this "NACA" practical industry support function, and need to be led back toward it. If they prefer sexy ultra-advanced decades-off technology work so much they still refuse to do the NACA job, the task (and the funding) should be given to someone else. *end*