Space Access Update #94 07/09/00 Copyright 2000 by Space Access Society ________________________________________________________________________ Space Access Society was born on the Fourth of July, 1992. We're officially eight years old now (though like actress and ballplayer birthdates, ours is a bit deceptive) and all we have to say is, my oh my, these are interesting times. Gary Hudson has left Rotary Rocket, all sorts of promising approaches are gone from NASA's SLI "Space Launch Initiative", X-33 is on lifesupport till after the election, X-34 is under the post Mars-screwup microscope, and NASA's "2nd- Generation RLV Program" is under the axe - and we think the Congress *should* chop a major part of it, and we're going to ask you all to tell them so over the next couple of weeks. And then there's this new angle on why we've been in a space-launch blind alley since 1970 - something we heard at this year's Space Access '00 conference clicked, and a pattern emerged that makes a lot of sense of recent decades. Speaking of our annual Space Access conference, this year's went well - see Jeff Foust's and Larry Niven's reports at: http://www.spaceviews.com/2000/05/article3a.html http://www.space.com/sciencefiction/larryniven/niven_rocket_men_000616.html In a burst of enthusiasm, we've already signed a hotel contract for next year's Space Access '01. It'll be at the same place as this year, the Holiday Inn Old Town in Scottsdale Arizona, Thursday evening April 26th through Saturday evening April 28th, 2001. Watch www.space-access.org for details. ________________________________________________________________________ Contents: - Cheaper Space Launch: Stranded On The Demand Curve - X-33 Impasse Unlikely To Be Resolved Before Election - Cash Transfusion (And Who Pays), Or Pull the Plug? - NRA 8-27 Awards Foreshadow NASA SLI Direction - Alert: "RLV Competition And Risk Reduction" NASA Budget Line Should Be Eliminated ________________________________________________________________________ Stranded On The Flats Of The Demand Curve: Cheap Launch In Limbo Consider how the demand for space launches varies with changes in launch cost. Start plotting launch cost at infinity and reduce it as you move to the right, with demand on the vertical axis... At the infinite-cost start of our plot, demand is at zero - for most of history, all the wealth of the planet couldn't have put a BB into orbit. Then, as cost drops to mere millions per pound, demand starts stirring - at least if you have a Cold War going on and national security requires that you keep up with the other guy. After you get halfway good at flying modified missiles to space and the huge R&D costs are written off, you find you can actually get costs down to mere tens of thousands of dollars per pound. At that point, things get interesting - you find there are things you can do that pay off. Surveillance of the other side in that Cold War, first of all, and right along with that Cold War national-prestige missions, and then comes the money app, communications. And then, as launch costs come down more... not much happens. Nobody cares. You've hit a flat "price-inelastic" section of the demand- versus-cost curve; costs can drop more without persuading anyone to buy more flights. Since 1970, launch costs have come down to mere thousands of dollars per pound, with some bargains as low as two thousand a pound - but the people buying spysats and comsats and national-prestige missions have decided how many launches they need based mainly on other factors - even as low as a couple thousand a pound, there's been no launch-buying spree. The demand curve is flat. This is not just us saying this; the government-sponsored industry- wide Commercial Space Transportation Study (CSTS) back in the nineties concluded that not only are we in a flat section of the launch demand curve, but also that the flat section extends to well below a thousand dollars a pound - their estimate was that launch demand wouldn't start taking off in response to lower costs until six hundred dollars a pound. Somewhere around that point, existing space operators might start modifying their operations to take advantage of lower costs, and more important, new applications would start springing up. Past that point, the curve isn't flat anymore, and the sky's the limit. Meanwhile, though, we're still stranded out here on the flat section of the curve. This has significant consequences for space-launch investment decisions. We'll just hit the high points for now; a detailed analysis would take a book. (Depending on the launcher, the destination, and the customer, US launch costs can actually vary quite a bit, but for the sake of argument, call the current cost of American space launches $10,000 per pound. It's far from a free market in international launch; considering US launch in isolation makes sense for our purposes.) (Again for the sake of argument, let's call launch cost reductions of up to half "minor", of up to ten-fold "major", and of twenty-fold or more "radical". Note that "major" reductions would still leave launch cost above the point in the curve where demand finally starts rising fast - only "radical" cost reductions would get past that point.) (This is, by the way, why Space Access Society pursues "radical" reductions in the cost of launch. We see no point in working this hard merely to increase some launch company's profit margins or to reduce the slice of NASA's budget it devotes to the limited number of launches it uses each year. We want to see revolutionary growth in the space economy get underway, soon, because we think that would be one of the finest gifts anyone could give to this country and to the world in this coming century.) The major established launch contractors have no incentive to invest in lower space launch costs, beyond minor investments aimed at minor cost reductions that show up in higher profits on existing traffic. Large investments aimed at major cost reductions would tend to have the effect of significantly reducing their launch business cashflow, as their largest single customer, the government, would insist on having the savings passed along. At worst, it would lead to a price war in the relatively flat commercial market and both majors would take a very large space-launch business hit. Beyond that, neither major is at all likely to go even further and pursue "radical" twentyfold-or-more cost reduction - the potential payoff may be huge, but it's a long-term and speculative payoff; the new markets can't be straight-line projected from current markets, and they won't spring into being overnight. The current majors have too much near-term existing cashflow that would be put at risk; if their management did try such a thing, their stockholders might well fire them - and rightly so, at least by current business theory. Our read of Lockheed-Martin is that they've reacted to this by a dual- track strategy of, to date, soaking up most available government cheap-launch R&D money so none of their competitors (competitor, now) could get the jump on their existing high-cost launch business, while pursuing government financing for their own "Venturestar" concept in the hope of using other people's money to get the jump on their remaining competitor. They have, understandably, showed not the slightest interest in putting their own money on the line for more than a fraction of any major launch cost reduction project. Boeing, meanwhile, seems to have kept their powder dry in the form of a reusable launch engineering department that stays ready to go, when and if Boeing is forced to go by external competition, but not one moment sooner. They also seem to have had their Washington lobbyists oppose "Breaux Bill" Venturestar loan guarantees, for which we for our own reasons are grateful. Let's look at the various startup launch companies now. All have pursued some "major" degree of reduced cost as their only real hope of being able to compete on price and grab a slice of the existing market near-term enough to attract investors. The ones of interest to us have taken approaches that also have potential for eventual "radical" cost reductions at higher flight rates. To date, though, neither the conservative nor the conservative/radical approaches have attracted enough investment to get to orbit - the lure of a highly regulated flat market (even flatter now that the LEO coms companies are in trouble) has not sufficed for the conventional investors, and the number of long-term high-risk visionaries willing to plow in several hundred million dollars on faith remains at zero. (This is why we continue to insist that the government must be the investor of last resort in pushing launch costs down to "radically" lower levels - the country and the world would benefit hugely, but getting past the break-point in the demand curve has so far taken too much money and time for private investors in the current climate.) And finally, we come to NASA. NASA's current Space Launch Initiative policy is to pursue "major" (up to tenfold, but they hint that they'd settle for two or three-fold) decreases in launch cost, in order to allow them to continue doing what they currently do in space, launching a half-dozen heavy manned and a dozen or so medium unmanned missions every year, for somewhat less money. The problem with this is that SLI is predicated on, after NASA subsidizes prototype development, commercial investors putting up several times that much money to build operational vehicles that will give NASA their cheaper launches and somehow also gain enough commercial traffic to make money and pay off the investors. And as we've seen, the main effect of a three-to-tenfold launch cost reduction on the current market is going to be a major reduction in overall market cashflow. No commercial investor in his right mind is going to put money into pursuing that result. Absent some flavor of government subsidy - loan guarantees or a market guarantee, and at that point it isn't a commercial operation, it's a quasi-government monopoly - it isn't going to happen. NASA has a legitimate interest in pursuing major reductions in cost for their in-house launch needs. But commercial launch vendors, as we've seen, are more hurt than helped by mere "major" tenfold reductions in launch cost. NASA needs to bite the bullet and budget for their own modest cost- reduction needs separately from their support for the commercial requirement for nothing less than "radical" twenty-fold or more launch cost reductions. The US commercial launch market must somehow get past the flat sector of the demand curve. So far, private investors haven't shown themselves ready to do it. Absent powerful level-playing-field launch investment incentives, if NASA won't do it either, some government agency that will do it must be found and funded, soon. The potential benefits are far too large for the nation to forego for another generation via foolish reliance on NASA's current "'2001' by 2040" plan. ________________________________________________________________________ X-33 Impasse Unlikely To Be Resolved Before Election: Cash Transfusion (And Who Pays), Or Pull the Plug? Following the internal workings of NASA is a bit like tracking events in the old Soviet Union. When things are going well, they'll tell you all about it. When things aren't going well, finding facts is like pulling teeth. Often, the most informative source there is is what NASA won't tell you and how they won't tell it - the outlines of the informational no-go areas can speak volumes. Things aren't going well for X-33. One of the composite multi-lobe tanks failed massively during routine test last fall, and the report on that (and on problems with the program in general) was originally due out last winter. The trouble seems to be, though, that this report is supposed to say how NASA and Lockheed-Martin are going to deal with the various problems - and as best we can tell, they can't agree on a fundamental point: Who pays for the extra couple years of work both sides seem to think it'll take to fly X-33. Our best guess as to the nature of the impasse is, NASA refuses to pay because there's no money in their budget for X-33 past this September (X-33 was originally supposed to fly in March '99; the most recent blown schedule said July '00, AKA now) and because, well, the contract they have with Lockheed-Martin, the "Cooperative Agreement", says Lockheed-Martin pays for any overruns. Lockheed-Martin meanwhile is understandably reluctant to dip into their own pocket for the couple hundred million dollars extra (minimum) to get X-33 to flight - they are already in enough trouble with their stockholders over recent technical and financial performance problems. Neither side is eager to do the obvious thing, admit the project is too far up a blind alley to be worth salvaging and shut it down, because neither needs another expensive embarrassment right now. Lockheed-Martin however quite probably thinks they have negotiating leverage, because NASA needs the embarrassment even less than they do. Not only is NASA currently trying to get the new SLI funded, but the White House that NASA works for is trying to get the man who unveiled Lockheed-Martin's win of X-33 elected President. It wouldn't likely be a major embarrassment (though it might put another dent in that candidate's reputation for technological savvy) but no embarrassment is welcome during a Presidential campaign. The most recent public word on when the X-33 report was due out said, late May. Since then, not a peep, officially, but the unofficial word had it that X-33 work at NASA has been "put to sleep" till after the November election. Our estimate of the situation is, that's exactly what makes sense for NASA, for Lockheed-Martin, and for the White House (though not the taxpayers): Put off any decision until after the election. Everything we see says that's exactly what NASA's doing. ________________________________________________________________________ NRA 8-27 Awards Foreshadow NASA SLI Direction "NRA 8-27" was the NASA Research Announcement soliciting bids for initial SLI study contracts. Awards were announced last month, and we have to say we were surprised - we'd expected NASA to be more politically astute and hand out at least token study contracts to all the startups, in addition to the predictable awards to the established majors. Instead, they showed their hand early, freezing out a number of the startups whose approaches were more focussed on radically higher flight rates and radically lower costs to open up commercial high-volume markets than they were on meeting NASA's launch needs. NASA Marshall pretty much stuck to the established STAS (Space Transportation Architecture Study) contractors in making the NRA 8-27 awards, which we think does not bode well for there being any room within SLI for approaches aimed at getting past the flat part of the launch demand curve and into the steep-growth region. "The customer is NASA." ________________________________________________________________________ Alert: "RLV Competition And Risk Reduction" NASA Budget Line Should Be Eliminated Background The "commercial" portion of NASA's new Space Launch Initiative, done in the manner NASA looks more and more certain to do it, will be worse than doing nothing at all. It will most likely fail in the same inconclusive manner as the current X-33 program, at twice the price, wasting five more years and additional billions of taxpayer dollars. In the unlikely event it does "succeed", it will have created a quasi- governmental space-launch monopoly that will stall the space market short of the high-growth part of the curve for a generation to come. We do not oppose the other two major portions of SLI, "NASA-Unique Systems" and "Alternative Access". NASA-Unique Systems appears to be aimed at some flavor of "Space Taxi" Crew/Cargo Transfer Vehicle, something which will assure capability to meet NASA's basic manned- space obligations without (as best we can tell) unduly disrupting commercial markets. We think this will be a good thing if NASA pulls it off, and even if they fail it shouldn't do much harm. Our colleagues over at ProSpace and the Space Frontier Foundation, meanwhile, have put a lot of effort into promoting Alternative Access (to Space Station) as a way of supporting the RLV startup companies. We're not convinced NASA Marshall won't turn it into a program to have one of their local contractors build a FasTrac-powered expendable, but for the moment we think AA deserves the benefit of the doubt. We'd like to be proved wrong. But absent radical changes in the "RLV Competition & Risk Reduction" plan, we recommend killing this $2.5 billion-over-five-years ($145 million this coming FY'01) part of SLI now, in the hope that whatever new Administration takes over next January will rethink things. We believe it's better to wait one more year than waste another five. The House HUD/VA Appropriators (NASA is funded in the HUD/VA And Independent Agencies bill), in a tactical budgetary move last month, already zeroed the entire FY'01 $290 million NASA "Second Generation RLV" program, the core of SLI. This includes $145 million for "RLV Competition & Risk Reduction" (including its associated "Systems Engineering & Requirements Definition" budget line), $50 million for NASA-Unique Systems, $40 million for Alternative Access, and $55 million for Ongoing Pathfinder Programs (the final-year windup of X-34, X-37, and the other former "Future-X" programs.) The Senate VA/HUD Appropriators should meet and "mark up" their version of the bill towards the end of this coming week of July 10th. Early word is that they're inclined to restore the entire $290 million for "Second Generation RLV"; we have a few days to make the case to members of this Senate subcommittee to kill the "RLV Competition & Risk Reduction" budget line. Once the Senate Appropriators finish their VA/HUD Appropriation markup, the bill goes to the full Senate for amendment and passage. Sympathy for (or even awareness of) our opposition to the "RLV Competition" budget line by any or all Senators will be extremely helpful here if it ends up being the subject of floor action. Once the Senate passes their VA/HUD Appropriation, the next step - sometime between next week and the end of the summer - will be a House-Senate HUD/VA conference committee, which will meet to hammer out a compromise between House and Senate versions of the HUD/VA funding bill. The members of this conference committee will be mainly drawn from the House and Senate HUD/VA Subcommittees. This will be the final (and possibly the best) real chance for us to persuade Congress to kill NASA's "RLV Competition & Risk Reduction" FY'01 budget request line. (Federal FY'01 starts this October 1st.) Action Recommendations As early as possible this coming week, if one of the VA/HUD Subcommittee Senators is from your state, contact their Washington DC office via phone, fax, or paper mail, and ask them to zero the NASA "RLV Competition & Risk Reduction" budget line. Ask them to do that specific thing, explain briefly why, then thank them for their attention and ring off/end the letter. Senate Appropriations Committee, VA/HUD Subcommittee: Bond MO, Burns MT, Shelby AL, Craig ID, Hutchison TX, Kyl AZ, Stevens AK, Mikulski MD, Leahy VT, Lautenberg NJ, Harkin IA, Byrd WV. For DC office voice/fax numbers or mailing addresses, check www.vote- smart.org. For the rest of you, check whether your member of the House of Representatives is on its Science Committee, Space Subcommittee or on its Appropriations Committee, HUD/VA Subcommittee. If so, contact them as above; make the case for killing the NASA "RLV Competition" line as well as you can. We may well be asking all of you to contact your Representative and both your Senators on this in the coming weeks. If you don't fall into either of the above categories, it can't hurt and might help to do this now. Understand that you'll probably get told "we're not on that subcommittee", at which point just say you wanted to let them know you feel strongly about this, and anything they can do would be appreciated. That's all for now - thanks for your help in this! ________________________________________________________________________ Space Access Society's sole purpose is to promote radical reductions in the cost of reaching space. You may redistribute this Update in any medium you choose, as long as you do it unedited in its entirety. ________________________________________________________________________ Space Access Society http://www.space-access.org space.access@space-access.org "Reach low orbit and you're halfway to anywhere in the Solar System" - Robert A. Heinlein